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We report the isolation and characterization of a high-
ly pathogenic avian influenza A/H5N1 virus from Crested
Hawk-Eagles smuggled into Europe by air travel. A screen-
ing performed in human and avian contacts indicated no
dissemination occurred. Illegal movements of birds are a
major threat for the introduction of highly pathogenic avian
influenza. 
T
he 2003–2004 highly pathogenic avian influenza epi-
demic caused by an A/H5N1 virus has become estab-
lished in 8 Southeast Asian countries (1). It affects not
only birds but several mammals (2–4). As of February
2005, 55 laboratory-confirmed human cases, 42 fatal,
have occurred after direct transmission of the virus (avail-
able from http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influen-
za/country/en/).
The Study
On October 18, 2004, 2 Crested Hawk-Eagles
(Spizaetus nipalensis) smuggled into Europe from
Thailand were seized at Brussels International Airport (5).
Clinical examination of the birds showed no symptoms. As
import of birds and products from several Asian countries
into the European Union (EU) is forbidden (DG Sanco
Decision 2004/122/EC), the birds were humanely sacri-
ficed and immediately sent to the Veterinary and
Agrochemical Research Centre for routine diagnosis to
exclude influenza and Newcastle disease viruses. 
The eagles were transported in a hand luggage
(Figure 1), with the zipper not totally closed to allow air to
enter. The bird smuggler, a Thai resident, took connecting
flights from Bangkok to Brussels, with a stopover in
Vienna; he placed his hand luggage in an overhead
compartment during both flights. When interviewed, the
Thai man declared that he “bought the eagles on a major
Bangkok market, a few days before departure, as a present
for [his] brother living in Belgium.” The eagles reportedly
had no contact with domestic animals before departure. A
few days later, a Belgian falconer declared he had ordered
the eagles and offered €7,500 for each bird. 
Necropsy and further testing were carried out at the
Veterinary and Agrochemical Research Centre (virologic
procedures according to EU Council Directive 92/40/EEC
of 19 May 1992). Both eagles had enteritis, and 1 had
bilateral pneumonia. Samples were taken from lungs and
injected into embryonating eggs, which died in <2 days.
The isolated virus was denominated A/crested
eagle/Belgium/01/2004. The antigenic subtyping as H5N1
was made by hemagglutination inhibition using 12 mono-
specific polysera. The diagnosis was confirmed by nucleo-
protein gene (general for type Ainfluenza) and H5-specific
reverse transcriptase–polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR)
(primers summarized in Table). Sample quality was con-
trolled by using 18S rRNA as housekeeping control gene
DISPATCHES
702 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 11, No. 5, May 2005
*Veterinary and Agrochemical Research Centre, Brussels,
Belgium; and †Scientific Institute of Public Health, Brussels,
Belgium
Figure 1. Crested Hawk-Eagles confiscated at Brussels
International Airport in the hand luggage of a Thai passenger. The
birds were wrapped in a cotton cloth, with the heads free, and
each of them inserted in a wicker tube ≈60 cm in length, with 1 end
open. Pictures courtesy of Paul Meuleneire, custom investigations
officer, antidrug group.with bird-conserved primers (Table), validated against a
variety of bird species (including chicken, duck, goose,
and crow) and tissues (spleen, brain, lung, trachea, cecum,
liver; unpub. data). The high pathogenicity of the virus was
confirmed by measuring the intravenous pathogenicity
index in chickens (IVPI = 2.94). 
After tracing birds that had passed through the customs
inspection center during the at-risk period, the Federal
Agency for Food Chain Safety killed several batches of
birds, notably 2 parrots at the customs inspection center,
200 parrots in a quarantine center, and 450 birds in anoth-
er quarantine center. They were tested by RT-PCR and
virus isolation on embryonating egg or cell culture. All
were negative for the H5N1 strain. As soon as the results
from the tested hawk-eagles were known, 25 persons who
had been in direct or indirect contact with the infected
eagles in Brussels airport were rapidly traced back, exam-
ined, and given oseltamivir prophylaxis. The Thai man and
a close contact went to the police immediately after hear-
ing about the diagnosis of avian influenza in the news.
They were immediately brought to Antwep University
Hospital, put into an isolation unit for 4 days, monitored,
and given oseltamivir prophylaxis. All exposed persons
remained asymptomatic, except for the veterinarian who
euthanized the birds; bilateral conjunctivitis developed 2
days after he examined the birds. His family was given
prophylaxis as well. 
The Scientific Institute of Public Health informed the
health authorities of all EU member states, as well as the
appropriate EU authorities. Passengers who had taken the
same flights as the bird smuggler were informed by the
media to seek medical advice if they had any influenzalike
symptoms within 7 days after the flight. Swabs (2 nasal
and 1 throat) from 23 persons (21 custom officers, the
smuggler, and a close contact) as well as a tear swab col-
lected from the veterinarian, who had conjunctivitis, were
tested by using nested RT-PCR to achieve maximal sensi-
tivity: one to detect influenza A and B and the second for
subtyping of influenza A H5 (Table). Primers from the
human β-actin gene were used as housekeeping genes for
control and designed by using a published sequence
(GenBank accession no. M10277) (Table). All samples
(including the tear swab) were negative for influenza A or
B and confirmed negative for H5. The conjunctivitis tear
swab sample was confirmed to be negative by injection
into embryonating eggs.
A 645-bp part of the hemagglutinin (HA) gene, span-
ning the HA cleavage site, was sequenced 3 times from
each of 3 independent RT-PCR amplification products
(primers specified in Table). The amplicons were cloned
into a pCR2.1-TOPO vector (TOPO TA cloning kit,
Invitrogen, Carlsbad, CA, USA) and plasmid DNA from
positive colonies was purified (Qiaprep miniprep kit,
Qiagen, Valencia, CA, USA) before sequencing
(BigDyeTerminator v.3.1 cycle sequencing kit, Applied
Biosystems, Foster City, CA, USA). The 645-bp partial
HA sequence (GenBank accession no. AY861372) of
A/crested eagle/Belgium/01/2004 contained 5 mutations
relative to its nearest isolate A/Ck/Thailand/9.1/2004
(H5N1) (GenBank accession no. AY651328; identity score
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ing in a unique arginine (R) > lysine (K) replacement,
which contains 6 basic amino acid residues KRRKKR,
whereas all Thai isolates from 2003 and 2004 have
RRRKKR. As the occurrence of multiple basic amino
acids in the cleavage site marks highly pathogenic H5 and
H7 influenza Astrains (9), this finding confirms the results
of the IVPI experiment. We aligned the partial HA
sequence to 35 representative GenBank entries (ClustalW
multiple alignment) and calculated a neighbor-joining phy-
logenetic tree based on this alignment (Figure 2 [10]).
High bootstrap values support the clustering of A/crested
eagle/Belgium/01/2004 together with strains from the cur-
rent Asian H5N1 epidemic. Moreover, all of these 2004
Thai-Viet strains clearly belong to the previously
described highly pathogenic Z genotype cluster (10).
Conclusions 
The simultaneous resurgence of the H5N1 epidemic
across several countries during the summer of 2004 indi-
cated that the virus has become endemic in Asian poultry.
This situation represents an increasing threat for public
health since constant multiplication and circulation of the
virus might help selecting mutations that adapt the virus to
new hosts. This continuous evolution (10) is supported by
our study, which showed that, although the A/crested
eagle/Belgium/01/2004 virus still belongs to the Z geno-
type, an amino acid change was observed in the HAcleav-
age site. The exchange of an arginine by a lysine conserved
6 basic amino acids in the cleavage site, a molecular struc-
ture demonstrated by reverse genetics studies as being the
optimal sequence for highly pathogenic avian influenza
virus cleavability and pathogenicity (11).
Although Spizaetus nipalensis, a CITES2-listed species
(Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species), is well distributed in the H5N1 affected regions
in Thailand (12), no details are currently available that
might explain how the birds got infected. One possibility
is that they were fed infected chicken carcasses before
their departure to Europe. The birds may thus have been
infected very shortly before their transportation. This sce-
nario might explain why no clinical symptoms were found.
Alternatively, avian wildlife may have a higher resistance
to the disease before they exhibit clinical signs and then
die suddenly. Preliminary quantitative real-time RT-PCR
data collected in our laboratory (data not shown) support
this explanation as they show a viral load in the eagles sim-
ilar to poultry infected with highly pathogenic avian
influenza (13). In a zoo in Cambodia, a variety of free-fly-
ing and captive birds, including raptors, were reported as
being infected with the H5N1 virus (available from
http://www.fao.org/docs/eims/upload/159535/AVIbull016.
pdf). The disease appeared first in raptors, including hawk-
eagles, in the first 2 to 3 days, indicating their high suscep-
tibility. They were most probably fed infected chicken car-
casses. The only other report of H5N1 in wild raptors
consists of a single peregrine falcon found dead in Hong
Kong (available from http://www.oie.int/eng/info/hebdo/
AIS_60.htm). Unfortunately, no histopathologic confirma-
tion of the cause of death or viral load assessment studies
about this case have been communicated. There have also
been 2 reports of avian influenza infections of falcons with
H7 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus. Manvell et al.
(14) reported the isolation of a highly pathogenic avian
influenza virus of H7N3 subtype from a peregrine falcon
dying in the United Arab Emirates. During the highly path-
ogenic avian influenza virus outbreaks in Italy in 2000, an
H7N1 virus was isolated from a Saker Falcon that died 3
days after normal hunting activity (15). The raptor had a
sudden onset of depression, weakness, and anorexia the
day after normal hunting activity and died 2 days later
without further clinical signs.
This study demonstrates that international air travel and
smuggling represent major threats for introducing and dis-
seminating H5N1 virus worldwide. Hunting with falcons
is practiced in several countries around the world. Here,
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Figure 2. Neighbor-joining phylogenetic tree (rooted to A/turkey/
England/50-92/1991) based on the alignment of a 654-bp frag-
ment of the hemagglutinin gene of A/crested eagle/Belgium/2004
(bold italic), including the cleaving site. Bootstrap values >50
(1,000 replicates) are indicated near the branches. The Z cluster
refers to Li et al. (10).the falconer who ordered the birds already owned 4 other
eagles of the same species. The 2 birds detected by cus-
toms may reflect a much larger underlying problem of bird
smuggling. Such birds easily remain undetected because
customs officers are essentially focused on metal objects,
although airport scanners can theoretically detect bones of
animals. Specific methods for systematically detecting live
animals (e.g., trained dogs) should be considered at air-
ports and borders (5). This method is now under evaluation
in Belgium. 
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